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Abstract
As globalisation progresses, cross-border movements of
people are becoming dynamic and multilateral. The
existence of different groups and minorities within the com-
munity renders the society multiethnic and multicultural. As
individuals acquire new affiliation and belonging, the con-
ventional conflict of laws methods may no longer be viable
and should be subject to a thorough re-examination.
Against this background, this paper analyses appropriate
conflicts rules in international family relations to reflect an
individual’s identity. Furthermore, in light of the contempo-
rary law fragmentation, this study also analyses interactions
between state law and non-state cultural, religious or cus-
tomary norms.
Keywords: global governance, family relations, nationality,
habitual residence, party autonomy
1 Introduction
As globalisation progresses, cross-border movements of
people are becoming frequent, dynamic and multilater-
al. Immigrants from other regions or continents now
render the vast majority of societies on the globe multi-
ethnic and multicultural.1 The existence of various
groups and minority communities with divergent eth-
nic, cultural or religious backgrounds entails an inherent
risk of compromising social cohesion.2 Especially in
Europe, discordant moral concepts and legal institutions
aroused by Muslim immigrants result in 'conflicts of
cultures'.3 It is, therefore, a crucial question how best to
accommodate cultural diversity and pluralism while
upholding social order and fundamental values in the
recipient society.
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1. Y. Nishitani, 'Cultural Diversity and the Law: State Responses from
around the World' (book review), ZvglRWiss 112, at 153 ff. (2013).
2. M-C. Foblets and N. Yassari, 'Cultural Diversity in the Legal Framework:
Modes of Operation', in Foblets and Yassari (eds.), Legal Approaches to
Cultural Diversity (Leiden/Boston 2013), at 3 ff.
3. See, inter alia, L. Gannagé, 'Les méthodes du droit international privé à
l’épreuve des conflits de cultures', Recueil des cours 357, at 238 ff.
(2011); R. Ahdar and N. Aroney, 'The Topography of Shari’a in the
Western Political Landscape', in Ahdar and Aroney (eds.), Shari’a in the
West (Oxford/New York 2010), at 1 ff.
The conventional method of conflict of laws, which goes
back to Savigny in the mid-nineteenth century,4 consists
in pointing to the law that has the closest connection
with the legal relationship concerned. This method
focused on localising the legal relationship, departing
from the territoriality of legal systems grounded in posi-
tive state law.5 However, the drawbacks and limitations
of this method are gradually coming to light in view of
the contemporary dynamic diversification of societies
and cultures. Once individuals acquire a new,
alternative affiliation or belonging,6 the viability of con-
ventional connecting factors needs to be re-examined.
Furthermore, the increasing importance of religious or
customary norms leads to a query as to whether and
how far non-state norms interact with state law and
should be considered or respected in regulating cross-
border family relations.7
This paper examines from a viewpoint of global
governance how conflict of laws should deal with cross-
border family relations. It analyses possible solutions
grounded on the effectivity of rules, rather than abstract
territorial proximity to the legal relationship,8 seeking a
balance between state regulation and individual
freedom. While the hegemony of sovereign states is
gradually decreasing in globalisation in general, state
governance has not lost its primordial importance in
cross-border family relations in terms of upholding
social order and protecting vulnerable parties through
mandatory rules. Against this background, the paper
first sheds light on contemporary discussions on the
appropriateness of the principle of nationality or the
principle of habitual residence in determining personal
law. The study particularly contemplates how best to
ascertain the law governing international family rela-
tions from the perspective of individual identity. Sec-
ond, in view of cultural diversity and the multiplication
of legal sources, the interactions between state law and
non-state law and their possible accommodation in con-
flict of laws will be expounded on the basis of several
examples. The results of this study will be summarised
in conclusion.
4. F.K. von Savigny, System des heutigen römischen Rechts, Vol. 8 (Berlin
1849), at 2 ff.
5. H. Muir Watt, 'Les modèles familiaux à l’épreuve de la monidialisation
(aspects de droit international privé)', Arch. phil. droit 45, at 272
(2001).
6. Foblets and Yassari, above n. 2, at 3 ff.
7. Cf. P.S. Berman, Global Legal Pluralism. A Jurisprudence of Law
beyond Borders (New York 2012), at 25 ff.
8. Muir Watt, above n. 5, at 272.
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2 International Family Law and
Identity of Individuals
2.1 Premises
In cross-border family relations, the first question to be
asked is: Which law should govern an individual’s per-
sonal status and his or her family relations? In other
words, how should the personal law inherent in each
individual be determined?
There has long been a dichotomy between origo and
domicilium9 in this respect, which has been regarded as
the largest hindrance to unifying conflict of laws rules
worldwide.10 It is a discrepancy of whether to subject
persons settling abroad to the law of their country of
origin or to that of the host country. While common law
countries traditionally apply the law of domicile or lex
fori to international family relations,11 civil law countries
in general have relied on the principle of nationality
since the nineteenth century. In recent years, however,
European continental countries have gradually been
moving toward the principle of habitual residence. We
therefore face the difficult challenge of how to assess
these contemporary dynamics and find a reasonable sol-
ution to them.
2.2 Individual Identity
Family law is called siège des différences,12 as each legal
institution reflects different traditions, religions, cus-
toms, values and ethics. While the marriage generally
consists in heterosexual monogamy, Islamic law allows
polygamy, and a series of European countries provide
for same-sex marriage. Divorce is effected by court
decree in Western countries, whereas Jewish and Islam-
ic laws provide for a unilateral act of the husband, and
Asian countries allow consensual divorce. The Vatican
and the Philippines still forbid divorce.13
In the globalised world, family relations are built across
divergent legal institutions. Once religious or ethnic
minority groups seek to observe their own religious or
customary rules on polygamy, dower (mahr) or repudia-
tion (talaq), parallel subsystems may appear. Because
individual actors are primarily affected in family
relations,14 conflict of law rules should be geared to
reflecting the individual’s affiliation or belonging. As
Jayme states, the law that mirrors the person’s identity
9. See Savigny, above n. 4, at 39 ff.
10. Y. Loussouarn, 'La dualité des principes de nationalité et de domicile en
droit international privé', Annuaire de l’Institut de droit international
62-1, at 299 ff. (1987); L.I. de Winter, 'Nationality or Domicile? The
Present State of Affairs', Recueil des Cours 128, at 357 ff. (1969 III).
11. See Dicey, Morris & Collins, The Conflict of Laws, 15th edn (London
2012), Vol. 1, paras. 6-166 ff.
12. Y. Lequette, 'Le conflit de civilisations à la lumière de l’expérience fran-
co-tunisienne', in Mélanges Sassi Ben Halima (Tunis 2005), at 175.
13. See, inter alia, Staudinger/Mankowski (2011), Art. 17 EGBGB, para. 19
ff.
14. B. von Hoffmann and K. Thorn, Internationales Privatrecht, 9th edn
(München 2007), at 186.
will best accommodate their family relations,15 even if
states reserve the authority to exceptionally intervene on
the grounds of public policy and human rights.16 In
terms of conflict of laws methods, US revolutionary
theories grounded in the state’s authority pursuant to
governmental interests,17 substantive better law18 or
contingent lex fori19 are not suited to achieving this
objective. Rather, the point of departure needs to be the
legal relationship concerned.
An individual’s identity is conceived subjectively.
According to Taylor, the consciousness of self presup-
poses the existence of others and is established through
interactions with them. By finding commonalities or
differences, an individual obtains the sense of belonging
to a certain collectivity with others.20 The relevant fac-
tors may be ethnicity, nationality, gender, language,
religion, customs or any other element.21 The collectivi-
ty to which the individual belongs, therefore, is not only
the state but can also comprise an ethnic minority, reli-
gious community, professional group, association or any
other category including abstract ones.22 By nature, an
individual’s identities are necessarily relative and multi-
ple. Since every person initially acquires their identities
by birth, forms self-consciousness and develops
personality later, identities cannot be fixed, but may
alter subsequently and dynamically.23 In this respect,
15. See E. Jayme, 'Identité culturelle et intégration: le droit international
privé postmoderne', Recueil des cours 251, at 33 ff., 167 ff. (1995); id.,
'Le droit international privé du nouveau millénaire: la protection de la
personne humaine face à la globalisation', Recueil des cours 282, at 31
ff. (2000); id., 'Kulturelle Identität und internationales Privatrecht', in
Jayme (ed.), Kulturelle Identität und internationales Privatrecht (Hei-
delberg 2003), at 5 ff.; id., 'Die kulturelle Dimension des Rechts – ihre
Bedeutung für das Internationale Privatrecht und die Rechtsverglei-
chung', RabelsZ 67, at 216 ff. (2003); id., Zugehörigkeit und kulturelle
Identität. Die Sicht des internationalen Privatrechts (Göttingen 2012),
at 9 ff.; see also H. Gaudemet-Tallon, 'Nationalité, statut personnel et
droits de l’homme', in Festschrift Erik Jayme, Vol. 1 (Berlin 2004), at
206 ff.
16. The same idea underlied the 2005 Krakow Resolution of the Institut de
droit international: 'Différences culturelles et ordre public en droit inter-
national privé de la famille' (to be downloaded at: <www. idi -iil. org/ >
[last visited 15 October 2014]).
17. B. Currie, 'The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental
Interests and the Judicial Function', in Selected Essays on the Conflict of
Laws (Durham/NC 1963), at 188 ff.
18. R.A. Leflar, American Conflicts Law, 3rd edn (Indianapolis/NY 1977), at
212 ff.
19. A.A. Ehrenzweig, Private International Law. A Comparative Treatise on
American International Conflicts Law, Vol. 1: General Part (Leyden/NY
1967), at 91 ff.
20. C. Taylor, 'The Politics of Recognition', in Multiculturalism. Examining
the Politics of Recognition (Princeton, N.J. 1994), at 25 ff.: 'My own
identity crucially depends on my dialogical relations with others.' (Ibid.,
at 34).
21. The same person can be, without any contradiction, an American citi-
zen, of Caribbean origin, with African ancestry, a Christian, a liberal, a
woman, a vegetarian, a historian, a schoolteacher, a novelist and a fem-
inist. A. Sen, Identity & Violence. The Illusion of Destiny (2006), at xii
ff.
22. H-P. Mansel, 'Die kulturelle Identität im Internationalen Privatrecht',
BerDGesVO 43, at 144, 153 (2008); see also A. Mills, The Confluence
of Public and Private International Law. Justice, Pluralism and Subsidi-
arity in the International Constitutional Ordering of Private Law
(Cambridge 2009), at 108 ff.
23. Sen, above n. 21, at 28 ff.
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Huntington’s thesis of the 'clash of civilizations'24 was
inappropriately grounded in an abstract, collective
notion of civilisation and enclosed individuals in firm,
inert categories. The limitations of his doctrine consis-
ted in the fact that he disregarded individuals’ differen-
ces and the possibility of their dynamic developments.25
2.3 Principle of Nationality
How should we then select the law that mirrors the per-
son’s identities?
In the nineteenth century, the principle of natio-
nality was first adopted in France (1804)26 and Austria
(1811).27 It was bilateralised and theoretically refined in
Italy (1865) under the auspices of Mancini,28 and spread
to other civil law countries such as Germany (1896),29
Belgium,30 Turkey,31 and Japan (1898),32 as well as
some Latin American countries.33 The newly-establish-
ed nation states of the time had obvious interests in
emancipating the concept of nationality from its feudal
fetters in order to define the membership and place
their citizens under direct control, eliminating inter-
mediate collectivities.34 Regulating citizens’ family rela-
tions even after emigration had the advantage for nation
states of upholding their national integrity.35 Presuming
that each individual is inscribed of characteristics of the
nation to which he or she belongs and has the conscious-
ness of nationality, Mancini asserted that family rela-
tions should be governed by the law of the person’s
nationality. He held that sovereign states were obliged
to reciprocate by respecting the rights of individuals
belonging to other states, and therefore need to apply
24. S.P. Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations?', Foreign Affairs, at 22
(Summer 1993); id., The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of
World Order (Japanese edition, Tokyo 1998), at 19 ff.
25. M-C. Najm, Principes directeurs du droit international privé et conflit
de civilisations. Relations entre systèmes laïques et systèmes religieux
(Paris 2005), at 5 ff.
26. Art. 3(3) Civil Code.
27. Arts. 4 and 34 ABGB.
28. Arts. 6 ff. Disposizioni preliminari del codice civile; see Y. Nishitani,
Mancini und die Parteiautonomie im internationalen Privatrecht (Hei-
delberg 2000), at 68 ff.
29. Arts. 7 ff. EGBGB; see H-P. Mansel, Personalstatut, Staatsangehörigkeit
und Effektivität (München 1986), at 28 ff.
30. Art. 3(3) Civil Code. See G. van Hecke, 'Les projets de Titre préliminaire
de Laurent et de la commission de révision', in Liber Memorialis
François Laurent 1810-1887 (Bruxelles 1989), at 1119 ff.
31. See E.E. Hirsch, 'Die Quellen des internationalen Privatrechts in der
Türkei', in Festschrift Hans Lewald (Basel 1953), at 245 ff.
32. Arts. 3 ff. Hôrei [Act on Application of Laws] (Law No. 27 of
21.6.1898); see Y. Nishitani, 'Mancini and the Principle of Nationality in
Japanese Private International Law', in Festschrift Erik Jayme, Vol. 1
(München 2004), at 630 ff.
33. De Winter, above n. 10, at 373 ff. To enhance the integration of immi-
grants in the host society, quite a few Latin American countries follow
the principle of domicile. Y. Tameike, Kokusaishihô Kôgi [Lecture of Pri-
vate International Law], 3rd edn (Tokyo 2005), at 90.
34. See H. Holzhauer, 'Staatszugehörigkeit in der deutschen Rechtsge-
schichte', in Gedächtnisschrift Albert Bleckmann (Köln et al. 2007), at
213 ff.
35. Europe consisted mostly of emigration countries at that time. See
J. Basedow and B. Diehl-Leistner, 'Das Staatsangehörigkeitsprinzip im
Einwanderungsland. Zu den soziologischen und ausländerpolitischen
Grundlagen der Nationalitätsanknüpfung im Internationalen Privat-
recht', in Jayme and Mansel (eds.), Nation und Staat (Heidelberg 1990),
at 20 ff.; see also Nishitani, above n. 32, at 633 f.
the law of nationality to their own nationals as well as to
foreigners respectively.36 Needless to say, this argument
presupposes the idea that individual identity coincides
with nationality.
In this context, it is worth recalling the debate that took
place in France when Article 310 Civil Code was adop-
ted in 1975.37 This unilateral conflicts rule stipulated
that divorce was governed by French law, insofar as
both spouses were French nationals (para. 1) or
domiciled in France (para. 2), or, in the absence of these
factors, when none of the spouses’ law of nationality
recognised its own competence (para. 3). This provision
particularly subjected foreign spouses domiciled in
France to French law, aiming to enhance their integra-
tion into the host society.38 Not only was this unilateral
conflicts rule thoroughly criticised for its theoretical
inconsistency,39 but Morocco also denounced it for
imposing French law upon Moroccan nationals, given
that their religion, customs and traditions would unduly
be disregarded in France. This led to the signing of a
bilateral treaty between France and Morocco40 in 1981
to deviate from this provision and refer to the law of the
spouses’ common nationality. The treaty eventually
ensured the application of Moroccan divorce law to
Moroccan nationals in France, as was the case prior to
the enactment of Article 310 Civil Code.41
Where the parties maintain social, cultural or religious
ties with their country of origin of which they are
national, applying the law of nationality appears expedi-
ent. Indeed, the Japanese legislature decided to retain
the principle of nationality in 1989,42 with a view to
respecting the identity of Korean and Chinese nationals
who had lived in Japan for decades. This step was cru-
36. See P.S. Mancini, 'De l’utilité de rendre obligatoires pour tous les États,
sous la forme d’un ou de plusieurs traités internationaux, un certain
nombre de règles générales du droit international privé pour assurer la
décision uniforme des conflits entre les différentes législations civiles et
criminelles', Clunet 1, at 293 (1874); id., 'Della nazionallità come fon-
damento del diritto delle genti', in Diritto internazionale (Napoli 1873),
at 27 ff., 57 ff.
37. Loi no 75-617 du 11 juillet 1975 portant réforme du divorce. Art. 310
Civil Code was then moved to Art. 309 Civil Code in 2005 (Ordon-
nance no 2005-759 du 4 juillet 2005 réformant la filiation) and eventu-
ally substituted by the Rome III Regulation (below n. 85).
38. J. Foyer, 'Tournant et retour aux sources en droit international privé?
L’article 310 nouveau du Code civil', JCP 1976, I-2762.
39. P. Courbe, 'Le divorce international: premier bilan d’application de
l’article 310 du Code civil', Trav. Comité fr. dr. int. pr. 1988-1990, at
123 ff.; P. Franceskakis, 'Le surprenant article 310 nouveau du Code
civil sur le divorce international', Rev. crit. dr. int. pr. 1975, at 554 ff.
40. Art. 9 Convention franco-marocaine du 10 août 1981 relative au statut
des personnes et de la famille et à la coopération judiciaire; décret
n° 83-435 du 27 mai 1983 (J.O. du 1er juin 1983, at 1643).
41. See F. Monéger, 'La convention franco-marocaine du 10 août 1981 rel-
ative au statut des personnes et de la famille et à la coopération judici-
aire', Rev. crit. dr. int. pr. 1984, at 267 ff.
42. Law No. 27 of 28.6.1989.
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cial for the Japanese government to avoid being criti-
cised for assimilation policies.43
In their most recent legislations on private international
law, Japan (2006),44 the Republic of Korea (South
Korea) (2001)45 and the Republic of China (Taiwan)
(2010)46 have all upheld the principle of nationality and
presumably will adhere to it. In these countries, consen-
sual divorce, simple adoption and other status acts are
effected by declaration at a family registration office
which is bereft of substantive control, so that the con-
necting factor needs to be as ascertainable, precise and
stable as nationality.47 Furthermore, the nationality of
these countries can generally be assumed to be effective
under the jus sanguinis principle as well as the traditional
sole nationality principle.48 These countries have diver-
gent cultural backgrounds and family institutions on the
basis of a distinctive concept of consanguinity.49
Because the number of foreign residents is still limited,
multiculturalism has not yet been established in these
countries.50 Against this background, nationality is in
principle likely to reflect the person’s substantial and
cultural ties with his or her country of origin. Hence,
these East Asian countries have good reason to uphold
the principle of nationality,51 although the People’s
Republic of China (China) as a multi-unit state decided
43. T. Minami, Kaisei Hôrei no Kaisetsu [Commentary on the reformed
Hôrei] (1992), at 46 ff.; J. Torii, 'Revision of Private International Law in
Japan', Japanese Annual of International Law 33, at 54 ff. (1990); A.
Kunitomo, 'Das Staatsangehörigkeitsprinzip im japanischen Internatio-
nalen Privatrecht', in Kroeschell and Cordes (eds.), Vom nationalen zum
transnationalen Recht (Heidelberg 1995), at 116 ff. (with further refer-
ences).
44. Arts. 4 ff. Act on General Rules on Application of Laws (Law No. 78 of
21.6.2006) (hereinafter 'PIL'); see, inter alia, J. Basedow, H. Baum & Y.
Nishitani (eds.), Japanese and European Private International Law in
Comparative Perspective (Tübingen 2008) .
45. Arts. 6 ff. Act on Application of Laws (Law No. 966 of 15.1.1962); Arts.
11 ff. Private International Law Act (Law No. 6465 of 7.4.2001) (here-
inafter 'PIL').
46. Arts. 9 ff. Act on Application of Laws (Law of 26.5.2010) (hereinafter
'PIL').
47. See Y. Nishitani, 'Das japanische Familienregister und grenzüberschrei-
tende Rechtsverhältnisse', Zeitschrift für japanisches Recht 14, at 229
ff. (2002); Kunitomo, above n. 43, at 117.
48. Arts. 2-3, 11-16 Nationality Act of Japan (Law No. 147 of 4.5.1950,
last amended in 2008); cf. Arts. 2, 9 and 20 Nationality Act of Taiwan
(Law of 5.2.1929, last amended in 2006). In 2010, South Korea intro-
duced a series of exceptions to the sole nationality principle, alleviating
the obligation to renounce original nationality at naturalisation or select
one out of multiple nationalities. Arts. 2-3, 10, 12-15 Nationality Act of
South Korea (Law No. 16 of 20.12.1948, last amended in 2010).
49. See Y. Nishitani, 'Familienrecht in Ostasien — Tradition und Moderne in
Japan und der Republik Korea —', in Festschrift Dieter Martiny (Tübing-
en 2014), at 1179 ff.
50. In Japan, there are 2,049,123 foreign permanent residents (676,696
Chinese/Taiwanese, 526,575 South/North Koreans, 206,769 Filipinos),
making 1.6% of the whole population as of 2013. Brazilian nationals,
who are mainly the second- and third-generation of Japanese emi-
grants, reached 313,771 in 2007 but reduced to 185,644 in 2013 due
to restrictions to reenter Japan. See <www. e -stat. go. jp/ > (last visited on
1 March 2014); for South Korea and China, see, e.g., United Nations
Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division, 'Global
Migration: Demographic Aspects and Its Relevance for Development',
at 11 (Technical Paper No. 2013/6 [to be downloaded at: <www. un.
org/ esa/ population/ migration/ documents/ EGM. Skeldon_ 17. 12. 2013.
pdf>); for statistics in South Korea, see <http:// kostat. go. kr/ portal/
english/ news/ 1/ 16/ 3/ index. board> (last visited 15 October 2014).
to move to the principle of habitual residence in its
recent legislation of 2010.52
Nevertheless, from the viewpoint of global governance,
it is significant that the meaning of nationality is gradu-
ally changing in other parts of the world. The traditional
notion of nationality is geared toward nation-state
membership. Miller contends that national identity is
supported by the beliefs and common history of the
community, based on dynamic political participation
and territorial collectivity sharing distinctive character-
istics.53 The nationhood as an ideal and normative col-
lectivity has been defined contrastingly among states,
i.e., on the basis of consanguinity in Germany and
Japan,54 territorial community in France55 and eternal
allegiance to the Crown in the U.K.56 These differences
were traditionally reflected in the respective nationality
legislation in relation to the conditions of acquisition of
nationality by birth (jus sanguinis and jus soli, either in
combination or as alternatives), status acts and naturali-
sation, because nationality legislation is governed by
autonomy of the state in public international law and
EU law. The sole nationality principle used to be pre-
dominant, so each individual could be defined by his or
her belonging to a nation state.57
Since the 1970s, however, dual nationality started to be
accepted in various countries in an attempt to attain
gender equality and uphold ties with outbound migrants
for economic and sociopolitical reasons.58 In recent
years, inbound migrants have been rapidly increasing in
Europe. Immigrants and their offspring constitute
51. See Kunitomo, above n. 43, at 120 ff. Japan does not recognize North
Korea or Taiwan as a legitimate state or government, but courts apply
the law of these countries because of its effectiveness in the territory of
each. Whether the individual belongs to South Korea or North Korea, or
to the People’s Republic of China or Taiwan is primarily determined on
the basis of their identity, especially their political, social and cultural
background. Y. Satoh, 'Law Applicable to Personal Status of Korean and
Chinese Nationals before Japanese Courts', Japanese Yearbook of Inter-
national Law 55, at 325 ff. (2012).
52. 2010 Private International Law Act (hereinafter 'PIL'); cf. R. Huang,
'Chûgoku no Atarashii Kokusaishihô ni tsuite' [On China’s New Private
International Law], Tezukayama Hôgaku 22, at 81 ff. (2011).
53. D. Miller, Citizenship and National Identity (Cambridge et al. 2000), at
28 ff.
54. See H. Egawa, R. Yamada & Y. Hayata, Kokusekihô [Nationality Law],
3rd edn (Tokyo 1997), at 38 ff., 59 ff.
55. R. Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany
(Cambridge, MA 1992), at 3 ff.
56. M. Tadokoro, 'Kokusai jinkô-idô to kokka ni yoru membership no gov-
ernance' [Cross-Border Movements of Persons and the Governance of
Membership by the State], in Endo (ed.), Global Governance no rekishi
to shisô [History and Ideas of Global Governance] (Tokyo 2010), at 202
ff. The definition of nationhood can also subsequently change, depend-
ing on religious or political factors. Miller, above n. 53, at 34.
57. See, inter alia, 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating
to the Conflict of Nationality Laws; 1954 UN Convention on Stateless-
ness; 1961 UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness; 1963
European Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality
and on Military Obligations in Cases of Multiple Nationality.
58. Brubaker, above n. 55, at 144; for a comparison of France, the
Netherlands, Italy and Spain, see O.W. Vonk, Dual Nationality in the
European Union (Leiden 2012), at 48 ff. As a result, the 1997 European
Convention on Nationality left the treatment of dual nationality to each
state, abstaining from taking a uniform position. M.M. Howard, 'Varia-
tion in Dual Citizenship Policies in the Countries of the EU', Internation-
al Migration Review 39, at 703 ff. (2005).
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26.4% of the population aged 25–54 years in France,
23.4% in the UK, 22.9% in Belgium, and 21.9% in
Germany (2008).59 Given these developments, a num-
ber of European countries have introduced the jus soli
principle and abolished the requirement that the origi-
nal nationality be renounced for naturalisation. They
largely admit dual nationality in order to include
immigrants among the citizens and enhance their social
integration. In this respect, a certain confluence of
nationality legislation can be observed among European
countries.60 Germany, which used to strictly adhere to
the consanguinity principle, remarkably introduced a
generous jus soli principle in 1999, requiring only that
one parent has habitually resided in Germany for eight
years.61 As a result, 8.6% of immigrants and their off-
spring were dual nationals, and 94.5% of them pos-
sessed German nationality as of 2012.62 Similarly,
France has long combined jus sanguinis and jus soli.63
While only 40% of first generation immigrants held
French nationality, the ratio rose to 98% among second
and third generation immigrants as of 2008 (75% were
solely French nationals; 23% held both French and
another nationality).64
With the increasing number of dual nationals in Europe,
as well as in Latin America and Africa,65 the meaning of
nationality is gradually being relativised. Individuals are
no longer imprinted with the characteristics of a single
nation state or obliged to give unconditional allegiance
to it. They rather have multiple affiliations, privileges
and obligations, and may even seek to acquire nationali-
ty for economic or other utilitarian reasons.66 Mean-
while the majority of these states consider it a political
and economic advantage for the state’s own nationals to
also belong to another state.67 As a corollary of the con-
temporary relativisation and multiplication of individual
belongings, nationality can no longer be characterised by
daily plebiscite in Renan’s sense, which presupposes
constant and conscious political participation in the
59. European Commission, 'Migrants in Europe. A Statistical Portrait of the
First and Second Generation (2011)', at 122 (to be downloaded at:
<http:// epp. eurostat. ec. europa. eu/ > [last visited 31 March 2014]).
60. For a comparison of 15 European countries, see R. Hansen and P. Weil,
'Citizenship, Immigration and Nationality: Towards a Convergence in
Europe?', in Hansen and Weil (eds.), Towards a European Nationality.
Citizenship, Immigration and Nationality Law in the EU (Hampshire/
New York 2001), at 5 ff.; see also Vonk, above n. 58, at 53 ff.
61. § 4(3) No. 1 StAG (BGBl. 1999 I S. 1618); see C. Benicke, 'Auswirkun-
gen des neuen Staatsangehörigkeitsrechts auf das deutsche IPR', IPRax
2000, at 171 ff.
62. Statistisches Bundesamt, 'Bevölkerung und Erwerbstätigkeit. Bevölke-
rung mit Migrationshintergrund (2012)', at 123 f. (to be downloaded
at: <www. destatis. de/ > [last visited 31 March 2014]).
63. See Arts. 18 ff. and Arts. 21-7 Civil Code.
64. The scope of these statistics is limited to the population aged
18-50 years. Fiches thématiques: Population immigrée, at 115 (to be
downloaded at: <www. insee. fr/ > [last visited in March 2014]).
65. Vonk, above n. 58, at 50 ff.
66. Brubaker, above n. 55, at 144 ff.; Vonk, above n. 58, at 48 ff.; G-R. de
Groot and H. Schneider, 'Die zunehmende Akzeptanz von Fällen mehr-
facher Staatsangehörigkeit in West-Europa', Festschrift Koresuke
Yamauchi (Berlin 2006), at 65 ff.
67. Vonk, above n. 58, at 3 ff., 48 ff., 62 ff.
decision-making process of the state.68 In this respect,
the so-called democracy argument in conflict of laws to
justify the application of the law of nationality, on the
ground that individuals have the right to political partic-
ipation and can select and influence the legislators in
their home country,69 may provide legitimacy, but
remains all the more fictitious. As Batiffol rightly points
out, law is primarily enacted for collectivity, not for
individuals.70 Even if a democratic decision-making
process is ensured, legislation always entails the risk that
the majority’s position will be unduly imposed on indi-
viduals who only constitute minorities.
From the viewpoint of individual identity, Muslim
immigrants in Europe often uphold their consciousness
of belonging and close cultural ties with their country of
origin through endogamy and traditional large family
units. Living abroad amid an unfamiliar social environ-
ment, immigrants may well maintain or even strengthen
their connection with their home country by idealising
their original culture, religion, customs or traditions.71
In fact, quite a few Muslim women voluntarily start
wearing a headscarf in Europe to insinuate their identi-
ty, even if they had refused to do so in their country of
origin.72 In these cases, the application of the law of
nationality will be justified as respecting the individual’s
identity, conventional values and moral concepts. Nev-
ertheless, this does not necessarily apply to second or
third generation immigrants, who are more responsive
to the culture, customs, traditions and fundamental
values of the receiving country than first generation
immigrants. The younger generations may well have
developed their identity to be integrated into the host
society. People with immigration background could also
be bicultural, i.e., socially and culturally belonging both
to the country of origin and the country of residence.73
As mentioned above, nationality constitutes only a part
of multiple and multi-faceted individual identities.
Nationality therefore cannot be the sole, categorical cri-
teria for defining the person’s affiliation and
belonging.74 As Mansel puts it, it is only in ideal-typical
cases75 that a person’s identity is reflected in their
nationality.76 Otherwise, the law of nationality fails to
materialise individual identity, which is particularly the
68. E. Renan, 'Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?', in Ukai et al. (eds.), Kokumin
towa nani ka (Japanese translation) (Tokyo 1997), at 62.
69. H-P. Mansel, 'Das Staatsangehörigkeitsprinzip im deutschen und
gemeinschaftsrechtlichen Internationalen Privatrecht: Schutz der
kulturellen Identität oder Diskriminierung der Person?', in Jayme (ed.),
Kulturelle Identität und Internationales Privatrecht (Heidelberg 2003),
at 135 ff.; see also C. Stern, Das Staatsangehörigkeitsprinzip in Europa
(Baden-Baden 2008), at 48 ff.
70. H. Batiffol, Aspects philosophiques du droit international privé (Paris
1956; reedition 2002), at 202 ff.
71. Cf. Maghreb immigrants in France, despite their French nationality. Bru-
baker, above n. 55, at 148.
72. For headscarf discussions, see J.W. Scott, The Politics of the Veil (Japa-
nese translation, Tokyo 2012; original in Princeton University Press
2007).
73. Mansel, above n. 69, at 133.
74. Miller, above n. 53, at 34.
75. Mansel, above n. 69, at 130 ff., 135; id., above n. 22, at 164 ff.
76. Miller, above n. 53, at 35.
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case when the person feels that he or she belongs to a
religious or any other community different from the
state.77 The same is true when the person is not aware of
the content of the law of nationality due to its frequent
reforms, as is the case with recent legislations in
European countries.78
2.4 Principle of Habitual Residence
In the discussions on the determination of personal law
in Europe, the principle of nationality has been subject
to severe criticism since the 1950s.79 Nationality as a
public law notion was held unsuitable for determining
the law governing cross-border family relations, whereas
habitual residence – as the person’s centre of life – was
considered to have a substantial connection with the
person and reflect his or her social environment.
Moreover, nationality has institutional drawbacks as a
connecting factor and needs to be supplemented by
habitual residence (or any other factor) in the event of
dual nationality, statelessness or refugee status. Nor can
nationality serve as a connecting factor in the case of
spouses of different nationality when the method of cas-
cading connecting factors is employed with a view to
achieving gender equality.80
The Hague Conventions notably established the princi-
ple of habitual residence, inter alia, in relation to child
abduction and adoption, protection of children or
adults, as well as maintenance obligations.81 They
primarily envisage realising effective protection and
implementing necessary measures in light of the best
interests of the child and human rights.82 While the pol-
icy of these Hague Conventions could be understood as
designating territorial law that reflects the conditions of
social environment instead of personal law governing
internal family relations,83 the extension of the scope of
application of habitual residence is obvious in the EU,84
77. D. Henrich, 'Parteiautonomie, Privatautonomie und kulturelle Identität',
Deutsches, ausländisches und internationales Familien- und Erbrecht
(Bielefeld 2006), at 440.
78. Henrich, above n. 77, at 439.
79. R. Cassin, 'La nouvelle conception du domicile dans le règlement des
conflits de lois', Recueil des cours 34 (1930 IV), at 752 ff.; S. Braga,
Staatsangehörigkeitsprinzip oder Wohnsitzprinzip? (Erlangen 1954), at
9 ff.; E. Wahl, 'Zur Entwicklung des Personalstatuts im europäischen
Raum', in Wahl et al. (eds.), Rechtsvergleichung und Rechtsvereinheit-
lichung (Heidelberg 1967), at 123 ff.; P-H. Neuhaus, Die Grundbegriffe
des internationalen Privatrechts, 2nd edn (Tübingen 1976), at 210 ff.
80. Vonk, above n. 58, at 118 ff., 120 ff. (for solutions in the case of dual
nationalities).
81. See, inter alia, 1980 Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction; 1993 Convention on Protection of Children and Co-
operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption; 1996 Convention on
Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-opera-
tion in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protec-
tion of Children; 2000 Convention on the International Protection of
Adults; 2007 Protocol on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obliga-
tions (to be downloaded at: <www. hcch. net/ > [last visited 15 October
2014]).
82. See D. Baetge, Der gewöhnliche Aufenthalt im internationalen Privat-
recht (Tübingen 1994), at 5 ff., 18 ff.; M-P. Weller, 'Der "gewöhnliche
Aufenthalt" — Plädoyer für einen willenszentrierten Aufenthaltsbegriff
—', in Leible and Unberath (eds.), Brauchen wir eine Rom 0-Verord-
nung? (Sipplingen 2013), at 302.
83. J. Akiba, 'Horei no Kaisei Kitei to Jôkyosho Kijunsetsu no Ronkyo ni
tsuite', Kokusaihô Gaikô Zasshi 90-2, at 113 ff. (1991).
particularly in relation to the Maintenance Regulation,85
the Rome III Regulation86 and the Succession
Regulation,87 besides the Proposal for a Regulation on
Matrimonial Property Regimes.88
The EU is seeking to constitute a uniform area of jus-
tice. Geared toward policy considerations,89 the EU opts
for habitual residence with a view to its coincidence with
jurisdiction under the Brussels II bis Regulation90 and
other relevant EU Regulations91 or domestic rules. The
application of lex fori will ensure the ascertainability of
applicable law and therefore the quality and expedi-
tiousness of court proceedings.92 Also because people
generally possess assets at their habitual residence, it is a
particularly expedient connecting factor for succession
and matrimonial property regimes.93 Furthermore, the
principle of habitual residence has the advantage of
subjecting all inhabitants to the same law, so it can
guarantee equal treatment for both EU citizens and
immigrants.94 In fact, by regulating the family relations
84. The UK and Ireland also substitute habitual residence for domicile in
relation to the Hague Conventions and the EU Regulations, so that
habitual residence is commonly used as the criteria for determining the
local connection of an individual. Dicey, Morris & Collins, above n. 11,
paras. 6-166 and 172.
85. Art. 15 of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 4/2009 of
18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and
enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to mainte-
nance obligations, OJ 2009, L 7/1 (reference to the 2007 Hague Main-
tenance Protocol, above n. 81).
86. Art. 8 (a)(b) of the Council Regulation (EU) No. 1259/2010 of
20 December 2010 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of
the law applicable to divorce and legal separation, OJ 2010, L 343/10.
87. Art. 21 (1) of the Regulation (EU) No. 650/2012 of the European Par-
liament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on jurisdiction, applicable law,
recognition and enforcement of decisions and acceptance and enforce-
ment of authentic instruments in matters of succession and on the crea-
tion of a European Certificate of Succession, OJ 2012, L 201/107.
88. Art. 17 of the Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, applica-
ble law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of
matrimonial property regimes, COM(2011) 126 final (16.3.2011); cf.
European Parliament legislative resolution of 10 September 2013
(P7_TA(2013)0338) (to be downloaded at: <http://www.euro-
parl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-
TA-2013-0338&format=XML&language=EN> [last visited 15 October
2014]).
89. H. Muir Watt, 'A Semiotics of Private International Legal Argument',
Yearbook of Private International Law 14, at 55 (2012/2013).
90. Art. 3(1)(a) of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 2201/2003 of
27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and
enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of
parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No. 1347/2000, OJ
2003, L 338/1.
91. Art. 3(a)(b) of the Maintenance Regulation, above n. 85, Art. 4 of the
Succession Regulation, above n. 87 and Art. 5(1) of the Proposal for
Matrimonial Property Regimes Regulation, above n. 88.
92. Weller, above n. 82, at 300.
93. Mansel, above n. 22, at 171.
94. D. Martiny, 'Ein Internationales Scheidungsrecht für Europa — Kontu-
ren einer Rom III-Verordnung', in Freitag et al. (eds.), Internationales
Familienrecht für das 21. Jahrhundert (Berlin 2006), at 127. The appli-
cation of the law of nationality itself does not run counter to EU law.
J. Basedow, 'Le rattachement à la nationalité et les conflits de nationa-
lité en droit de l’Union européenne', Rev. crit. dr. int. pr. 2010, at 427
ff.; M-P. Puljak, Le droit international privé à l’épreuve du principe
communautaire de non-discrimination en raison de la nationalité (Aix-
en-Provence 2003); cf. Stern, above n. 69, at 62 ff.; T. Troge, Europar-
echt und das Staatsangehörigkeitsprinzip im Internationalen Privatrecht
(Baden-Baden 2009), at 38 ff.
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of all inhabitants pursuant to its own law, the host state
is able to enhance social integration and shun creating
parallel societies.95 For the same reasons, countries built
through immigration like Brazil (1942)96 and
Switzerland (1987)97 moved from the principle of
nationality to that of domicile.
From the perspective of individual identity, the
application of the law of habitual residence is certainly
reasonable once immigrants are integrated into the
receiving country. Furthermore, children are, in gener-
al, acquainted with the social environment where they
habitually reside.98 The subsidiarity principle of inter-
national adoption99 is, therefore, considered to properly
respect their cultural identity.100 Nevertheless, habitual
residence cannot always accord with a person’s multiple
identities. Insofar as immigrants maintain cultural ties
with their country of origin and are conscious of their
affiliation and belonging, applying the law of habitual
residence would unduly inflict discordant rules and
values on them. This would also be the case when immi-
grants remain within their own community in the host
society and share their original religion, customs or tra-
ditions, establishing cultural enclaves.101 Even diasporas,
who are dispersed throughout various countries, may
maintain a strong cultural and political allegiance to the
country of origin without being integrated into the
respective host societies.102
2.5 Reflections
European countries will increasingly resort to the prin-
ciple of habitual residence, whereas other countries like
Japan and South Korea will presumably adhere to the
principle of nationality. Still, neither nationality nor
habitual residence is capable of fully meeting the
requirement of designating a law that correctly mirrors a
person’s identity. Because these objective connecting
factors are geared toward collective identity to be
represented by the state of their nationality or habitual
residence, they cannot precisely reflect an individual’s
identity by taking different conditions or demands of
each person into consideration.103
95. H-P. Mansel, 'Stellungnahme anlässlich der Sachverständigenanhörung
im Rechtsausschuss des Europäischen Parlaments zum Grünbuch für
internationales Erb- und Testamentsrecht' (Bruxelles, 21.11.2005)
(<www. ipr. uni -koeln. de/ veranstaltungen/ mansel_ de. pdf> [last visited
15 October 2014).
96. See Y. Nishitani, 'Divorce of Brazilian Nationals in Japan', ZJapanR/J.
Jap. L. 18, at 227 (2004).
97. Botschaft zum Bundesgesetz über das internationale Privatrecht (IPR-
Gesetz) vom 10.11.1982 (Nr. 82.072, BBl 1983 I 263), at 315 ff.
98. Weller, above n. 82, at 302.
99. Art. 4 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child; Art. 4(b) 1993 Hague
Adoption Convention, above n. 81.
100. E. Jayme, 'Kulturelle Identität und Kindeswohl im internationalen Kind-
schaftsrecht', in Henrich et al. (eds.), Ehe und Kindschaft im Wandel
(Frankfurt a.M. 1998), at 50 ff.; C. Lima Marques, Das Subsidiaritäts-
prinzip in der Neuordnung des internationalen Adoptionsrechts (Frank-
furt a.M. 1997), at 37 ff.
101. Mansel, above n. 22, at 173.
102. Berman, above n. 7, at 70 f.




3.1 Methods of Coordination
It is hard to avoid contingency of justice if some per-
sons’ identity is better reflected in their nationality,
while others have closer links with their habitual resi-
dence. Renvoi, as adopted in the 1955 Hague Conven-
tion,104 cannot assist in resolving this impasse, as it only
grants priority to one of the objective connecting factors
in an abstract way. Nor can the principle of recognition
in the EU bridge this schism, as it simply requests, like
the vested rights theory,105 the recognition of a person’s
name (or status) established in one of the EU member
states as such without inquiring which law was
applied.106 The conflicts rules of the first member state,
in which the legal situation has been constituted, remain
intact and prevail over those of the recognising member
state. The only question that matters is to decide in
which member state to create the legal situation first.107
With frequent cross-border movement of persons and
the accompanying exchange of values, the inherent bond
between individual identity, cultures and territory is
gradually weakening nowadays.108 The proper law of an
individual or family109 can hardly be sought solely by
104. 1955 Convention relating to the settlement of the conflicts between the
law of nationality and the law of domicile; cf. Baetge, above n. 82, at
18 f.
105. See J.H. Beale, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws, Vol. 1 (New York
1935), at 53 ff.; for a thorough theoretical analysis, see R. Michaels, 'EU
Law as Private International Law? Re-conceptualising the Country-of-
Origin Principle as Vested Rights Theory', Journal of Private Interna-
tional Law 2, at 195 ff. (2006).
106. Arts. 18 and 21 TFEU (Arts. 12 and 18 TEC); see CJEU, 2.10.2003, Case
C-148/02 [Carlos Garcia Avello v. Belgian State], Rep. 2003, I-11613;
CJEU, 14.10.2008, Case C-353/06 [Stefan Grunkin and Dorothee Regi-
na Paul], Rep. 2008, I-07639; CJEU, 22.12.2010, Case C-208/09 [Ilon-
ka Sayn-Wittgenstein v. Landeshauptmann von Wien], Rep. 2010,
I-13693; CJEU [Malgožata Runevič-Vardyn et al. v. Vilniaus miesto
savivaldybės administracija et al.], Rep. 2011, I-03787; for the principle
of recognition, see, inter alia, D. Coester-Waltjen, 'Das Anerkennung-
sprinzip im Dornröschenschlaf?', Festschrift Erik Jayme, Vol. 1 (Mün-
chen 2004), at 121 ff.; M. Grünberger, 'Alles Obsolet? Anerkennung-
sprinzip vs. klassisches IPR', in Leible and Unberath (eds.), Brauchen wir
eine Rom 0-Verordnung? (Sipplingen 2013), at 81 ff.; H-P. Mansel,
'Anerkennung als Grundprinzip des Europäischen Rechtsraums. Zur
Herausbildung eines europäischen Anerkennungs-Kollisionsrechts:
Anerkennung statt Verweisung als neues Strukturprinzip des Europäi-
schen internationalen Privatrechts?', RabelsZ 70, at 651 ff. (esp. 705 ff.)
(2006); K. Funken, Das Anerkennungsprinzip im internationalen Privat-
recht (Tübingen 2009); J. Leifeld, Das Anerkennungsprinzip im Kolli-
sionsrechtssystem des internationalen Privatrechts (Tübingen 2010).
107. Coester-Waltjen, above n. 106, at 123 ff.; Grünberger, above n. 106, at
158 f.; C. Kohler, 'L’autonomie de la volonté en droit international
privé: un principe universel entre libéralisme et étatisme', Recueil des
Cours 359, at 402 f. (2012); Mansel, above n. 106, at 717 ff. Bucher
qualifies it as 'droit à l’identité' to have one’s personal and family status
recognized within the EU in view of the free movement of persons.
A. Bucher, 'La dimension sociale du droit international privé', Recueil
des cours 341, at 377 (2009).
108. Cf. Berman, above n. 7, at 63 ff.
109. See J-Y. Carlier, Autonomie de la volonté et statut personnel (Bruxelles
1992), at 252.
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means of objective territorial links. Rather, personal
connection, which is best defined by the person himself
or herself, should be the controlling factor in determin-
ing the applicable law, as private actors are most affected
in cross-border family relations. Considering that indi-
vidual identity is conceived subjectively, it would be
consistent and reasonable to allow the parties to select
the law governing family relations themselves.
By virtue of party autonomy, albeit the law of habitual
residence is objectively applicable, the parties can
substitute it by the law of nationality when they have a
closer tie with their country of origin. Conversely, even
if nationality is the primary objective connecting factor,
the parties can refer to the law of habitual residence
instead when they are integrated in the host society
where they reside. Korean immigrants in Japan whose
forebears had settled in Japan during the colonial period
are a good illustration of this latter case. Today, second-
and third-generation Korean immigrants regularly
uphold family ties in North or South Korea but are
socially integrated into and culturally adapted to Japan
due to their permanent centre of life in that recipient
country. The optional application of the law of habitual
residence instead of that of nationality enables them to
constitute their family relations in conformity with their
primary identity.110
Arguably, the dichotomy between nationality and habit-
ual residence will be appropriately overcome by employ-
ing the method of the parties’ choice of law.111 Indeed,
party autonomy will render nationality and habitual res-
idence complementary connecting factors, rather than
mutually inconsistent criteria for determining personal
law that hamper international harmony of decisions.112
3.2 Party Autonomy in Family Relations
Apart from respecting individual identity, party
autonomy has the advantage of ensuring flexibility,
ascertainability and predictability of applicable law.
Family relations are becoming increasingly complex and
diverse due to the frequent and dynamic cross-border
movement of persons. If the governing law alters
depending on which nationality they hold, where they
live or where litigation is instituted, the parties can no
longer reasonably foresee the validity and effects of their
family relations, constitute rights and obligations, or
agree upon disposition of assets. Hence, party autonomy
is an appropriate conflicts rule for guaranteeing legal
certainty and enhancing the mobility of global and EU
110. H-C. Lee, 'Zainichi-Kankokujin no Zokujinhô' [Personal Law of Korean
Immigrants in Japan], Jurist 1025, at 98 ff. (1993); Kunitomo, above n.
43, at 121 ff.
111. Carlier, above n. 109, at 246 ff.; Foblets and Yassari, above n. 2, at 45
ff.; Kohler, above n. 107, at 411 ff.; Mansel, above n. 22, at 174 ff.;
A.E. von Overbeck, 'La professio juris comme moyen de rapprocher les
principes du domicile et de la nationalité en droit international privé',
Liber Amicorum Baron Louis Frédéricq, Vol. 2 (Gent 1966), at 1096 ff.;
M-P. Weller, 'Die neue Mobilitätsanknüpfung im Internationalen Fami-
lienrecht — Abfederung des Personalstatutenwechsels über die Datum-
theorie', IPRax 2014, at 228; see also 1987 Cairo Resolution and 2005
Krakow Resolution of the Institut de droit international, above n. 16 (to
be downloaded at: <www. idi -iil. org/ > [last visited 15 October 2014]).
112. Vonk, above n. 58, at 118 ff.
citizens.113 From the viewpoint of conflict of laws order,
party autonomy will facilitate international harmony and
consistency of applicable law. If the law of the forum
state can be chosen, it will particularly serve to
circumvent the application of foreign law and reconcile
divergent procedural rules in civil law and common law
jurisdictions on whether to apply foreign law ex officio
or leave it to the parties’ pleading and proof. This will,
in turn, enhance the integration of the EU.114
Legislative policy favouring party autonomy will argua-
bly be supported by the trends toward contractualisation
and individualisation in substantive family law, which is
a corollary of the diversification of family models in
society.115 However, unlike contracts or torts, legal rela-
tionships in substantive family law consist of fixed cate-
gories and mandatory rules with limited disposition of
the parties. Consequently, the eligible laws that can be
selected by the parties should reasonably be restricted to
the laws that indicate durable and substantive connec-
tion, i.e., the law of nationality and habitual residence,
and possibly lex fori and/or lex rei sitae.116 In case of
intra-community dual nationality in the EU, all laws of
nationality should qualify to be selected, as granting pri-
ority to the nationality of the forum state or the effective
nationality will run counter to the ECJ rulings in Garcia
Avello and Hadadi.117
Party autonomy in family relations is a recent develop-
ment.118 It was first approved for succession in the form
of the testator’s professio juris and119 then extended to
matrimonial property regimes and lately also to mainte-
nance obligations in proprietary relations, as in domestic
113. Cf. Kohler, above n. 107, at 425 ff.
114. E. Jayme, 'Party Autonomy in International Family and Succession Law:
New Tendencies', Yearbook of Private International Law 11, at 3
(2009).
115. K. Hilbig-Lugani, Nomos Kommentar BGB, Vol. 6: Rom-Verordnungen
(Baden-Baden 2014), Art. 5 Rom III-VO, para. 3; K. Kroll-Ludwigs, Die
Rolle der Parteiautonomie im europäischen Kollisionsrecht (Tübingen
2013), at 171 ff.; similarly, D. Coester-Waltjen and M. Coester, 'Rechts-
wahlmöglichkeiten im Europäischen Kollisionsrecht', in Festschrift Klaus
Schurig (München 2012), at 33 f.; for discussions in substantive law,
see, e.g., S. Hofer, D. Henrich & D. Schwab (eds.), From Status to Con-
tract ? — Die Bedeutung des Vertrages im europäischen Familienrecht
(Bielefeld 2005), at 1 ff.
116. H-P. Mansel, 'Parteiautonomie, Rechtsgeschäftslehre der Rechtswahl
und Allgemeinen Teil des europäischen Kollisionsrechts', in Leible and
Unberath (eds.), Brauchen wir eine Rom 0-Verordnung? (Sipplingen
2013), at 263.
117. Garcia Avello case, above n. 106; CJEU, 16.7.2009, Case C-168/08
[Laszlo Hadadi v. Csilla Marta Hadadi], Rep. 2009, I-06871; see S. Bar-
iatti, 'Dual Nationality: Between EU Citizenships', Yearbook of Private
International Law 13, at 1 ff. (2011); Mansel, above n. 106, at 693 ff.;
Vonk, above n. 58, at 127 ff. In this sense, also Art. 22(1) Succession
Regulation, above n. 87; for criticism against Recital 22 Rome III Regu-
lation leaving the solution to each member state’s rules, see E. Jayme,
'Kodifikation und Allgemeiner Teil im IPR', in Leible and Unberath
(eds.), Brauchen wir eine Rom 0-Verordnung? (Sipplingen 2013), at 40
ff.; Kohler, above n. 107, at 424.
118. Kroll-Ludwigs, above n. 115, at 99 ff.
119. See, inter alia, A.E. von Overbeck, 'L’irrésistible extention de l’autono-
mie en droit international privé', in Nouveaux itinéraires en droit. Hom-
mage à François Rigaux (Bruxelles 1993), at 628 ff.
141
Yuko Nishitani ELR November 2014 | No. 3
conflicts legislations,120 Hague Conventions,121 and EU
Regulations.122 Party autonomy appears expedient for
the sake of estate planning or the management of assets
and pecuniary claims, insofar as necessary protection of
weaker parties and third parties is guaranteed. Further-
more, party autonomy is now prescribed in relation to
divorce and legal separation as the core principle in the
Rome III Regulation,123 broadening the scope of choice
of law compared with some previous domestic legisla-
tions.124 Also for countries like Japan and South Korea
that stipulate consensual divorce based on the parties’
disposition on dissolution of marriage,125 it is worth
contemplating introducing the parties’ choice of law, as
has already been done in China.126 Party autonomy
should also be admissible in determining the law gov-
erning the first and last name that constitutes personali-
ty rights, enabling the person to select the law that best
reflects his or her multiple identities.127 The require-
ment of the EU law for recognition of a name granted in
an EU member state, as understood by the ECJ,128 can
also be appropriately fulfilled by allowing the party to
designate the applicable law.129
On the other hand, with regard to kinship and parental
responsibilities, it is crucial to provide necessary protec-
tion for children. A choice of law by parents, custodians
or guardians has potential risk of leading to an unfav-
ourable law jeopardising the best interests of the child.
Even though the state reserves the right to frustrate an
inappropriate choice of law that contravenes public poli-
cy or human rights, it would be more reasonable to
exclude party autonomy from the outset to avoid sys-
tematic substantive control of the designated law.130 As
to kinship, it would be expedient to refer to alternative
connecting factors in principle to constitute legal
parentage in the child’s interests.131 For the sake of
effective protection, parental responsibilities and meas-
ures for the protection of the child should be governed
objectively by the law of the child’s habitual residence,
120. For succession, e.g., Arts. 90(2) and 91(2) Swiss PIL; Art. 25(2) EGBGB,
Art. 49(2) Korean PIL; for matrimonial property regimes, e.g., Art. 15
Austrian PIL, Art. 52 Swiss PIL, Art. 15(2) EGBGB, Art. 26(2) Japanese
PIL, Art. 38(2) Korean PIL, Art. 48(1) Taiwanese PIL.
121. Arts. 3 and 6 of the 1978 Convention on the Law Applicable to Matri-
monial Property Regimes; Arts. 5 and 6 of the 1989 Convention on the
Law Applicable to Succession to the Estates of Deceased Persons; Arts.
7 and 8 of the 2007 Maintenance Protocol (see n. 81).
122. Art. 15 Maintenance Regulation, above n. 85; Art. 22 Succession Regu-
lation, above n. 87; Arts. 16 and 18 Matrimonial Property Regimes Pro-
posal, above n. 88.
123. Art. 5(1)(a)-(d) Rome III Regulation, above n. 86.
124. Art. 55(2) Belgian PIL; Art. 1(2)(4) Netherlands International Divorce
Law; Arts. 17(1) and 14 EGBGB.
125. See Nishitani, above n. 50, at 1196 ff.
126. Art. 26 Chinese PIL. On the other hand, judicial divorce is simply gov-
erned by the lex fori (Art. 27 ibid.).
127. Art. 10 EGBGB, Art. 37(2) Swiss PIL; cf. Grünberger, above n. 106, at
159.
128. See supra n. 106.
129. Arts. 47-48 EGBGB; Mansel, above n. 116, at 288 ff.
130. Foblets and Yassari, above n. 2, at 49.
131. Art. 19(1) EGBGB, Art. 68(1)(2) Swiss PIL, Arts. 28-30 Japanese PIL,
Arts. 40-42 Korean PIL.
which reflects his or her social environment and gener-
ally coincides with the forum.132
3.3 Limitations of Party Autonomy
Despite the advantages and importance of party autono-
my in contemporary private international family law, it
entails certain institutional drawbacks in terms of realis-
ing an individual’s identity. In the case of matrimonial
property regimes or divorce, the spouses need to agree
upon the applicable law. If agreement cannot be reached
between the spouses due to discordances of their prefer-
ence, party autonomy would remain ineffective. Fur-
thermore, for the sake of legal certainty, choice of law
cannot be granted every time an individual’s identity
changes, but needs to be subject to a certain time frame.
While a child acquires their first and family name at
birth following a decision of the custodian parents, it
cannot be altered subsequently solely because the child
has acquired different identity.133
What is more important from the viewpoint of global
governance is to inquire how to deal with cases in which
the individual has affiliation or belonging to an ethnic
minority or religious community rather than the state.
In these cases, the choice between the law of nationality
and that of habitual residence does not reflect the per-
son’s identity, given that the conventional conflict of
laws method is geared to state law conflicts and disre-
gards conflicts with or among non-state laws. This leads
to the question of whether there are any alternative con-
flict of laws methods that enable to take into account
non-state religious, cultural or customary norms.
4 Interactions between State
Law and Non-State Law
4.1 Premises
Viewing the relativity and multiplicity of individual
belonging and affiliation, the relevant legal institutions
and norms within minorities, religious communities or
any collectivities other than the state may be controlling
upon individuals. Indeed, family law has particularly
become a crucial platform for religious minorities in sec-
ular states to define their memberships and demarcate
their non-territorial communities. By prescribing mar-
riage, divorce and lineage of their members, religious
minorities seek to uphold and unify the group and
maintain its values, practices and distinct ways of life.
For individuals belonging to such a community and liv-
ing in its social environment, civil marriage, divorce or
paternity authorized by the state may solely have limited
meaning.134 In view of the current challenges of cultural
diversity and plurality of legal norms, due regard should
132. Arts. 15-22 of the 1996 Hague Convention, above n. 81.
133. Cf. Kohler, above n. 107, at 415.
134. A. Shachar, 'State, Religion, and the Family: The New Dilemmas of
Multicultural Accommodation', in Ahdar and Aroney (eds.), Shari’a in
the West (Oxford/New York 2010), at 120 f.
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be given to interactions between state law and non-state
law.135
In 2008, the District Court of Lille in France rendered a
decision that widely attracted attention.136 In this case,
two French Muslims of Moroccan origin celebtrated
marriage in France. The husband sought to annul the
union after he discovered that his wife was not a virgin,
contrary to the tenets of the Islam, and had lied to him
on this matter. The judge acceded to his claim and
acknowledged serious mistake about the fundamental
qualities of his wife (Art. 180 (2) Civil Code), on the
grounds that she consented to the claim and knew that
her virginity was a decisive factor for her husband to
enter marriage. According to leading authors, however,
the wife’s virginity is not a fundamental quality of the
spouse under the present French law, as it does not
render marital life impossible or unbearable, unlike
impotency or mental disorder. Obligating only the wife
retroactively to chastity and fidelity would also run
counter to gender equality and dignity of individuals.137
At the end of the day, the husband’s claim was dis-
missed by the Court of Appeal of Douai.138
In the underlying case, both spouses were French
nationals, so the conditions of marriage were governed
by French law (Art. 3 (3) Civil Code). The question was
whether and how far Islamic moral concept should be
taken into account in interpreting French law. Although
the judge at first instance was inclined to take Islamic
morality into account, the Court of Appeal ruled that it
was not feasible to sublime religious norms into the con-
struction and application of state law. As Malaurie
argues, the interpretation of the positive French law was
held to depend not on the spouses’ intent or the social
environment where they live but on the general con-
science of the nation.139
This interplay of state law and non-state law indicates
that the phenomena of conflict of laws may well shift
from territory-bound cross-border cases to domestic
cases, in light of the multiplying sources of legal norms.
In fact, the number of third-state immigrants who hold
the nationality of the host state is rapidly increasing in
Europe.140 Even if there is no conflict of laws due to a
lack of internationality of the case in the traditional
sense, there could still be a conflict of norms between
state law and non-state religious, cultural or customary
135. Berman, above n. 7, at 45.
136. Tribunal de grande instance de Lille, 1er avril 2008, Droit de la famille
2008-2009, no 111.91; JCP 2008, II-10122.
137. F. Terré, JCP 2008, act. 439; P. Malaurie, JCP 2008, act. 440; cf. F.
Chénedé, Droit de la famille 2008-2009, no 111.91; P. Labbé, Dalloz
2008, 1389; G. Raoul-Cormeil, JCP 2008, II-10122; G. Raymond, Droit
de la famille 2008, comm. 98; see also the appel submitted by the
prosecutor (below n. 138). They also point out that the wife’s consent
to the claim is not determinative, as the status issue is beyond the par-
ties’ disposition.
138. Cour d’appel de Douai, le 17 novembre 2008, Dalloz 2010, 728; JCP
2009, II-10005; Rev. trim. dr. civ. 2009, 98; see P. Malaurie, JCP 2009,
II-10005. The argument of the husband in favour of annulling the mar-
riage was shifted on appeal from lack of virginity to the character of the
wife in telling a lie, which was held insufficient grounds for annulment.
139. Cfr. Malaurie, above n. 137 and 138.
140. See supra 2.3.
norms. Similarly, while lex fori will regularly be applica-
ble in the capacity of the law of habitual residence under
the Hague Conventions and EU Regulations,141 a con-
flict of norms may yet occur in relation to non-state
norms. It is arguably expedient to carefully contemplate
methods of accommodating the plurality of legal sources
to respect cultural diversity and individual identities.
4.2 Data-Theory
While the primacy of state law over religious norms was
retained in the above-mentioned virginity case in
France, referring to non-state religious, cultural or cus-
tomary norms within the framework of the applicable
state law may well make sense and even be desirable in
other cases. This method is called the data theory. It has,
in particular, been advocated by Jayme to deal with con-
temporary challenges of conflict of cultures.142 A good
example was provided by Hoekema and van Rossum
based on their empirical study in Hamid’s case.143
Hamid and his wife, both of Turkish origin, were living
in the Netherlands with their two children. When the
wife became depressed, left the marital home and disap-
peared for some 18 months, the children were raised by
Hamid’s sister and parents in Turkey. On her return,
however, his wife successfully obtained sole custody
rights for their children subsequent to their divorce, in
accordance with the criteria of the best interests of the
child under Dutch law. The Dutch Child Protection
Board and the judge gave priority to the mother who
showed affectionate behaviour and could provide living
arrangements to personally take care of the children,
despite having abandoned them and disappeared for a
period.144
The authors indicate that children frequently grow up
in an extended family and are looked after by an aunt or
grandmother, while the father earns a living in Turkish
custom and tradition. Had the Dutch authority and the
judge properly considered such Turkish cultural back-
ground in assessing the best interests of Hamid’s chil-
dren, the outcome of the case could have been
different.145 The best interests of the child is an abstract
notion that is subject to further interpretation and sup-
plementation of meaning in concrete cases. It could have
served in the underlying case as a gateway for cultural or
customary norms to be taken into account in applying
the governing state law. The same reasoning could also
apply to other general notions in family law, such as the
irretrievable breakdown of marriage as a ground for
141. See supra 2.4.
142. E. Jayme, 'Kulturelle Identität und Internationales Privatrecht', in Jayme
(ed.), Kulturelle Identität und Internationales Privatrecht (Heidelberg
2003), at 10 f.; see also Weller, above n. 111, at 229 ff.; for 'data-
theory' in general, see A. Armin Ehrenzweig and E. Jayme, Private Inter-
national Law, Vol. 1 (Leyden 1967), at 77 ff.; J. Kropholler, Internatio-
nales Privatrecht, 6th edn (Tübingen 2006), at 41.
143. A.J. Hoekema and W.M. van Rossum, 'Empirical Conflict Rules in Dutch
Legal Cases of Cultural Diversity', in Foblets et al. (eds.), Cultural Diver-
sity and the Law. State Responses from around the World (Bruxelles
2010), at 851 ff.; see also Y. Nishitani, above n. 1, at 153 ff.
144. Hoekema and van Rossum, above n. 143, at 853.
145. Hoekema and van Rossum, above n. 143, at 864 ff.
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divorce.146 Arguably, the data-theory permits moderate
and reasonable interactions between the applicable state
law and non-state norms within the framework of the
traditional conflict of laws system.
4.3 Substantive Law Methods
In view of multicultural aspirations in society, states
may also incorporate religious or other non-state norms
into their substantive law system. For historical and
institutional reasons, Italian law recognises concordat
marriage celebrated under Canon law,147 whereas
Spanish and UK laws provide for, inter alia, Islamic and
Jewish marriage with civil effects in an effort to accom-
modate the spouses’ faith.148 Since Islamic law prohibits
adoption and only acknowledges kafala, Spain and the
UK introduced a corresponding institution of guardian-
ship to protect Muslim children and ensure them stable
family relations.149 The recent German legislation on
the circumcision of male infants sought to legalise the
established Muslim and Jewish ritual and custom.150 In
these countries, religious family institutions have been
transformed and translated into the state legal system
for the sake of cultural accommodation and respect for
individual identity.
On the other hand, states may well have interests in
exercising necessary control in an effort to preserve
social order and protect vulnerable parties, mostly wom-
en and children. In fact, a number of states have adop-
ted special rules to deter or sanction the forced marriage
of Muslim women, notably Sweden,151 Germany,152
Switzerland,153 and the UK154 They have subjected the
celebration of marriage under foreign law to a lex fori
146. Hoekema and van Rossum, above n. 143, at 867.
147. Art. 82 Italian Civil Code; Art. 8(1) Concordat ('Accordo tra la Repubbli-
ca Italiana e la Santa Sede') of 18.2.1984; cf. E. Jayme, 'Ordre public,
droit de l’homme et droit religieux', in von Bar (ed.), Islamic Law and its
Reception by the Courts in the West (Köln 1999), at 226.
148. Art. 49 Spanish Civil Code; cf. E. Jayme, IPRax 1997, 376 f.; Sec. 46 UK
Marriages Act, 1949; cf. W. Menski, 'Law, State and Culture: How
Countries Accommodate Religious, Cultural and Ethnic Diversity. The
British and Indian Experiences', in Foblets et al. (eds.), Cultural Diversity
and the Law. State Responses from around the World (Bruxelles 2010),
at 440 ff.
149. Art. 173 bis Spanish Civil Code; cf. L.Z. Sánchez-Eznarriaga, Derecho de
familia y de la persona,Vol. 2 (Barcelona 2007), at 682 ff.; E. Jayme,
'Kulturelle Relativität und internationales Privatrecht', in Schulze (ed.),
Kulturelle Relativität des internationalen Privatrechts (Baden-Baden
2014), at 63 f.; Sec. 115 UK Adoption and Children Act, 2002; Sec.
14A-G UK Children Act, 1989; cf. Menski, above n. 148, at 442 ff.
150. § 1631d German BGB (Gesetz über den Umfang der Personensorge bei
einer Beschneidung des männlichen Kindes vom 20.12.2012 [BGBl.
2012 I 2749]).
151. Cf. M. Bogdan, 'Die Reform des schwedischen IPR zur Vermeidung von
Kinder- und Zwangsehen', IPRax 2004, at 546 ff.
152. § 1317(1) BGB; § 237 StGB (Gesetz zur Bekämpfung der Zwangsheirat
und zum besseren Schutz der Opfer von Zwangsheirat sowie zur Änder-
ung weiterer aufenthalts- und asylrechtlicher Vorschriften vom
23.6.2011 [BGBl. I, 1266]).
153. Arts. 105 Ziff. 5 and 6 Civil Code; Arts. 44-45a PIL; Art. 181a Penal
Code (Bundesgesetz über Massnahmen gegen Zwangsheiraten vom
15.6.2012 [AS 2013 S. 1035]).
154. Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007. Further law reform is being
contemplated: see <www. gov. uk/ government/ uploads/ system/ uploads/
attachment_ data/ file/ 157829/ forced -marriage -response. pdf> (last visited
15 October 2014).
control,155 introduced penal sanctions and other regula-
tory mechanisms or facilitated the annulment of mar-
riages.156
Jewish divorce is also a good example. Jewish divorce is
effected in a ritual where the husband hands in a get, a
bill of divorce, to the wife in front of the Rabbinat. If
the husband refuses to do so in order to seek retaliation
or circumvent maintenance obligations, the wife is
bound to the religious marriage forever. Even after
obtaining civil divorce, she cannot remarry in Judaism,
and her children born from another man are severely
disadvantaged.157 As a remedy for a distressed Jewish
wife, the French Cour de cassation ordered the husband
to pay damages on ground of abuse of rights in 1972.158
The New York Court of Appeals took a different tack in
1983.159 In this Avitzur case, the wife sought to enforce
ketubah signed at marriage celebration, under which the
husband had promised to appear at Beth Din, a religious
tribunal, for advice and consultation on their marriage
including the granting of a get. The judge held that the
spouses had agreed to refer disputes to a non-judicial
forum in ketubah, which is not a religious issue and
therefore enforceable under neutral principles of con-
tract law, analogously as a prenuptial agreement. As a
result, the husband was ordered by the court to appear
before the religious tribunal to fulfil his contractual obli-
gation.160 Following this decision, the New York legisla-
ture adopted the so-called get statute, which stipulates
that a spouse needs to take all necessary measures to
eliminate any hindrance for the other spouse’s remar-
riage before applying for a divorce in the courts.161
Although formulated in gender and religion-neutral lan-
guage, it envisages indirectly obliging a Jewish husband
to submit a get to his wife. Comparable statutes have
been adopted in Ontario, Canada (1986),162 South Afri-
ca (1996),163 and the UK (2002).164 States will regulate
family relations and guarantee fundamental rights where
155. In the case of Sweden, see C. Kohler, 'Der Einfluss der Globalisierung
auf die Wahl der Anknüpfungsmomente im Internationalen Familien-
recht', in Freitag et al. (eds.), Internationales Familienrecht für das 21.
Jahrhundert (Berlin 2006), at 19 ff.
156. See supra n. 152-154.
157. T. Einhorn, 'Jewish Divorce in the International Arena', in Liber Amico-
rum Kurt Siehr (The Hague 2000), at 137; K. Siehr, 'Die Berücksichti-
gung religiösen Rechts bei gerichtlicher Scheidung jüdischer Ehepaare',
in Festschrift Peter Schlosser (Tübingen 2005), at 885 ff.; C. Herfarth,
Die Scheidung nach jüdischem Recht im internationalen Zivilverfah-
rensrecht (Heidelberg 2000), at 17 ff.
158. Art. 1382 Civil Code: Cour de cassation, 13 December 1972, Dalloz
1973, 493; Cour de cassation, 21 November 1990, Dalloz 1991, 434.
159. Court of Appeals of the State of New York, 15 February 1983 [Avitzur
v. Avitzur], 58 N.Y. 2d 108, 446 N.E. 2d 136, 459 N.Y. S.2d 572; cf.
14 September 1981 [Shapiro v. Shapiro], 442 N.Y. S.2d 928 (1981).
160. See F. Hötte, Religiöse Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit. Angloamerikanische
Rechtspraxis, Perspektive für Deutschland (Tübingen 2013), at 73 ff.;
cf. Supreme Court of Canada, 14 December 2007 [Bruker v. Marco-
vitz], 3 S.C.R. 607, 2007 SCC 54.
161. § 253, § 236(b)(5)(h) and § 230(B)(6)(d) New York Domestic Relations
Act; cf. Herfarth, above n. 157, at 311 ff.
162. Chap. 4, § 2(4)-(7), § 56 (5)-(7) Family Law Act 1990, as amended in
1986.
163. Sec. 5A Divorce Act 1979 (Act N o 95 of 1996, Sec. 1).
164. Sec. 10A Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, as amended by the Divorce
(Religious Marriages) Act 2002.
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necessary, even if doing so set certain restrictions on
moral concepts of religious communities and individual
identities.
Nevertheless, a troubling movement is currently being
observed in the USA. By the 2010 amendment of the
Oklahoma Constitution, a provision was introduced that
banned state courts from considering Shari’a law. Even
after it was held unconstitutional in 2013 under the
First Amendment of the US Constitution,165 other state
legislatures joined the movement by extending the pro-
hibition to all foreign laws and international law.166
Such excessive control, partly caused by lack of knowl-
edge or ungrounded fear of Islam, may negatively
impact US overseas business transactions and unduly
deny the validity of any religious family relations consti-
tuted abroad, including Jewish marriages celebrated
between US nationals in Israel.167
4.4 Religious Arbitration
The interactions between state law and non-state law
examined so far consist in integrating non-state norms
into the state law system through appropriate interpre-
tation or substantive legislation. These methods fit into
the long-established conflict of laws system and can be
accommodated without difficulty. It is, however, a dif-
ferent question whether religious or other non-state
norms qualify as the law governing family relations as
such. While the choice of non-state law in commercial
contracts has gained support to a certain extent,168
conflicts lawyers have been reluctant to apply the same
policy to family relations, in which objective connecting
factors have traditionally dominated and the parties’ dis-
position has been limited both in conflict of laws and
substantive law.169 Nevertheless, there have been
remarkable attempts to acquiesce autonomy of religious
institutions in conducting alternative dispute resolution
and recognise their effects in the state.
In Ontario, Canada, Shari’a arbitration was introduced
in 2004 by the Islamic Institute of Civil Justice to decide
family disputes between Muslims.170 Although there
had already been other religious arbitration for Men-
165. US District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, 15 August
2013 [Awad v. Ziriax], 966 F. Supp. 2d 1198.
166. For example, see F. Patel and A. Toh, 'Commentary: The Clear Anti-
Muslim Bias behind Anti-Shariah Laws', Washington Post, 22.2.2014.
167. Ibid.
168. For the latest discussion, see the draft Hague Principles on Choice of
Law in International Commercial Contracts (<www. hcch. net/ > [last vis-
ited 15 October 2014]).
169. In relation to Art. 10 Rome III, above n. 86 that replaces the applicable
foreign law which violates gender equality by lex fori, there have even
been lively discussions among academics about the eligibility of Egyp-
tian state law to be chosen by the spouses. Jayme, above n. 149, at
64 f.
170. M. Boyd, 'Dispute Resolution in Family Law: Protecting Choice, Pro-
moting Inclusion December 2004', at 4 ff. (to be downloaded at:
<www. attorneygeneral. jus. gov. on. ca/ english/ about/ pubs/ boyd/ fullreport.
pdf> [last visited 15 October 2014]).
nonites, Catholics, Jews and Ismailites,171 only the
Shari’a arbitration polarised public opinion due to fears
of Islamic fundamentalism and the oppression of wom-
en. Even the legitimacy of the multiculturalism provi-
ded for in the Canadian Constitution172 was queried.173
The debate eventually came to an end when the Ontario
legislature enacted Family Statute Law Amendment Act
2006, requiring all family arbitrations to be conducted in
accordance with Canadian law to the exclusion of reli-
gious law.174 As a result, the state primacy has been war-
ranted in regulating family relations and precluding the
autonomous decision-making authority of religious
institutions in arbitration.175
To maintain state regulation, Ontario took an all-or-
nothing approach, eliminating all religious arbitrations
as competing normative systems.176 Religious tribunals,
however, could indeed afford better protection to wom-
en than state courts in certain circumstances, as in the
case of Islamic mediation in the UK. In Islamic law,
divorce is unilaterally effected by the husband’s talaq
pronunciation in principle. Muslim women who have
obtained a civil divorce but have failed to persuade their
husbands to declare talaq, or who have only celebrated
an Islamic marriage and cannot seek civil divorce at state
courts often refer to mediation at Islamic councils in the
UK. For many devout Muslim women, mediation with-
in the religious community is the only viable path to
being released from religious marriage, even if this is
lacking in coercive measures and gender equality.177
In this respect, the faith-based tribunals are capable of
complementing the state legal system without substitut-
ing it. For the sake of shared responsibility, Shachar
advocates regulated interaction between state and
religion, providing the religious institutions with sub-
matter jurisdiction in arbitration, while reserving the
regulatory authority of the state to exercise ex ante con-
trol and ex post judicial review.178 If one could carefully
depart from the premise that state is able to provide
necessary control and put appropriate constraints, it
would presumably be worth contemplating institution-
alising alternative dispute resolution of religious com-
munities. The conventional dichotomy between state
and religion could eventually be mitigated, even though
171. K. Johnston, G. Camelino & R. Rizzo, 'A Return to "Traditional" Dispute
Resolution: An examination of Religious Dispute Resolution Systems',
Chap. II-III (to be downloaded at: <www. cfcj -fcjc. org/ sites/ default/ files/
docs/ hosted/ 16173 -trad_ dr. pdf> [last visited 15 October 2014]); Hötte,
above n. 160, at 129.
172. Sec. 27 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Canadian
Constitution Act, 1982).
173. Hötte, above n. 160, at 134 ff.
174. Family Statute Law Amendment Act 2006 (amending the Arbitration
Act 1991).
175. For further detail, see M. Rohe, 'Muslimische Identität und Recht in
Kanada', RabelsZ 72, at 475 ff., 502 ff. (2008).
176. Shachar, above n. 134, at 127 ff.
177. A. Phillips, Multiculturalism without Culture (Princeton/Oxford 2007),
at 172 ff.; N. Bialostozky, 'Volition and Religion: A Rights-Based
Appraisal of Islamic Arbitration in England', in Foblets and Yassari (eds.),
Legal Approaches to Cultural Diversity (Leiden/Boston 2013), at 603 ff.
178. Shachar, above n. 134, at 123 ff.
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religion could not thwart or supersede the regulatory
authority of state.
5 Conclusion
In the contemporary world, the global governance of
family relations needs to presuppose the diversity and
multiplicity of a person’s belonging and affiliation, as
well as the plurality of legal norms. Even the meaning of
nationality, which used to indicate an individual's
unique membership and allegiance to a nation state, is
gradually changing due to the increasing number of dual
nationals and frequent cross-border movement of
persons in the time of globalisation. These current con-
ditions of cultural diversity and law fragmentation chal-
lenge the conventional conflict of laws methods for
determining the law governing family relations. This
also leads to the question of whether and how far the
interrelations between state law and non-state law
should be taken into consideration in dealing with con-
flict of laws issues.
In order to reflect a person’s belonging and affiliation
when determining the applicable law, this paper analy-
ses the viability of relying on objective connecting fac-
tors, i.e., nationality and habitual residence. In light of
the contingency of justice in relying on one of these
objective connecting factors, this paper suggests
transcending this dichotomy by enabling the parties to
designate the applicable law themselves. At the end of
the day, this study indicates that, when reflecting on
appropriate conflicts rules for cross-border family rela-
tions, an all-encompassing notion of personal law, as
employed by Savigny,179 is no longer feasible. Rather, a
distinct, separate determination of applicable law is nec-
essary, tailored to the characteristics of each category of
legal relationship and appropriately adjusted by the par-
ties’ choice of law.
With regard to the interplay of state law and non-state
law, this paper expounds several examples to delineate
the way these alternate normative systems interact and
analyses the possible impact on the functioning of con-
flict of laws. This study suggests relativising the con-
ventional notion of the conflict of state laws and includ-
ing religious, cultural or customary non-state norms in
its scrutiny. While this study limits itself to addressing
these core issues, it points out that adopting a plurality
of methods when dealing with the conflict of cultures is
an inevitable consequence of the contemporary multipli-
cation of legal sources and law fragmentation. From a
viewpoint of global governance, it should further be
examined where the limitations of the current conflict of
law system lie, and whether and to what extent alterna-
tive methods are viable to consider the interrelations of
state law and non-state law. It remains to be seen wheth-
er a certain confluence of solutions can be sought
179. See supra n. 9.
around the world when dealing with this challenging
task.
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